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Summary 
The challenge of transforming entire economies is enormous, especially if a country is as fos-
sil-fuel-based and emission-intensive as South Africa. However, as it is already facing climate 
change impacts in an increasingly carbon-constrained world, South Africa must drastically 
reduce its greenhouse gas emission intensity soon. 
The South African electricity sector is a vital part of the economy and at the same time con-
tributes most to the emission problem. Transforming this sector is therefore urgently needed, 
but will be difficult. First steps have been taken to enhance energy efficiency and promote 
renewable energy, but they have failed to have any large-scale effects.  
The two major barriers to investments in renewable energy technologies are based in the 
South African energy innovation system and its inherent power structures and in the econom-
ics of renewable energy technologies. The innovation system is dominated by the state-owned 
Eskom (electricity) and Sasol (fuel) enterprises. Both companies have their core competencies 
in fossil fuel technologies. Capacity in renewable energy is lacking at every stage of the tech-
nology cycle, from research and development to installation and maintenance.  
The obstacles inherent in the economics of renewable energy technologies are cost and risk, 
two of the main factors in investment planning. As most technologies are in early stages of 
development, they have not yet realized their full cost degression potential and continue to 
entail a higher risk than established technologies. 
To overcome these barriers, the South African government has introduced several renewable 
energy support measures, such as a renewable energy feed-in tariff (REFIT). While a promis-
ing scheme in theory, the South African REFIT has a crucial flaw: Eskom is the monopsonis-
tic buyer of electricity produced from renewable energy and is responsible for distributing it 
to consumers. However, Eskom is not obliged to buy that electricity. This runs counter to the 
investment security the REFIT scheme was intended to give renewable energy producers.  
As a result, effective achievement on the ground continues to fall well short of the goals set in 
policy papers. While external financing, covering the additional costs for capacity-building 
and such policy measures as the REFIT, may be one part of the solution, the political will to 
reform the existing power structures in the electricity sector and to invest in the creation of a 
renewable energy market must form the other part. 
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1 The challenge 
Climate change is one of this century’s most serious problems. The Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) points to human activ-
ity as one of the major causes of global warming. Business as usual may lead to a disas-
trous transformation of the planet, and recent scientific findings emphasize the growing 
urgency of reducing greenhouse gas emissions (Meinshausen et al. 2009).  
The parties to the climate negotiation process under the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) are struggling to find an agreement that may prevent danger-
ous climate change. Yet the emission reduction proposals on the negotiating table are not 
strong enough to ensure that global warming stays at less than 2°C above the pre-
industrial level. This rise is internationally recognized as the limit to manageable global 
warming. Anything more than this will increase the damage to the global ecosystem and 
the risk of abrupt and large-scale climate discontinuities, also known as tipping points. 
Rapid and substantial emission reductions are vital, and they require a global structural 
change, mainly in the energy sector. 
Most past emissions have stemmed from the energy sector in high-income countries. Less 
than 25 per cent of cumulated emissions have been caused by developing countries (Stern 
2007, 175).1 However, the situation is changing. In recent years, the developing countries’ 
share of global emissions has been rising, and in 2000 they already accounted for about 55 
per cent of yearly global greenhouse gas emissions (WRI 2009).2 High economic growth 
in some of these countries has led to quickly rising energy demand. As this demand has 
been satisfied mostly by fossil fuels, emissions have also been rising. Estimates predict a 
continuation of this trend unless the energy sector, and especially electricity generation, is 
converted to using low-carbon technology. In a business-as-usual scenario put forward by 
the International Energy Agency (IEA) global energy-related emissions will rise by 45 per 
cent between 2006 and 2030 (IEA 2008b, 11). Almost all of this increase (97 per cent) is 
expected to occur in non-OECD countries, mostly due to greater use of coal. 
If these emission patterns prevail, they may lead to a temperature increase of up to 6°C 
(Schneider 2009, 1104; IEA 2008b, 11). Climate change of this magnitude would be 
catastrophic. Hundreds of millions of people, mainly in the developing world, might be 
exposed to water stress, hunger, and extreme weather events of unprecedented magnitude 
and frequency. Some 30 per cent of global coastal wetlands might be lost, and about half 
of known plant and animal species might be in danger of extinction (Schneider 2009, 
1105; IPCC 2007b). Business as usual is not, therefore, an option. 
At the same time, the lack of access to energy and the consequent restrictions to develop-
ment remain major challenges in developing countries. About 1.3 billion people still live 
without electricity, mainly in Africa and South Asia (World Bank 2009a). Enhanced en-
ergy access is essential if global poverty is to be reduced, but in the past it has always been  
                                                 
1 Stern (2007) defines the group of developing countries as equivalent to Non-Annex I parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol.  
2 To achieve comparability, developing countries in the following are defined as Non-Annex I parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol. 
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linked to rising emissions. The challenge therefore lies in decoupling energy and green-
house gas emissions so that more widespread energy use and decreasing emissions can be 
achieved simultaneously. The deployment of low-carbon technologies3 in developed and 
developing countries on a massive scale must be part of the solution. 
As many investments in low-carbon technologies are long-term in nature (e.g. energy in-
frastructure), they affect the climate over decades. The path leading to more climate-
friendly development through the deployment of these technologies must therefore be de-
termined as early as possible. Otherwise, a high-emission development path may be 
locked in for several decades, making a temperature rise of less than 2°C highly improb-
able. 
Funding for these massive investments may come from public as well as private sources. 
However, from the total needed it is obvious that public funding alone will not be enough. 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) estimates an 
additional annual requirement of USD 200 to 210 billion for mitigation in 2030. While 
public resources fall short of the total requirement, private investment may make a major 
contribution to meeting the challenge in the coming decades. According to the UNFCCC, 
1.1 to 1.7 per cent of global private investment would meet estimated additional needs in 
2030 (UNFCCC 2008, 19). Public finance has an important role to play in facilitating and 
                                                 
3 As this paper focuses on renewable energy, the use of the term “low-carbon technologies” seems appro-
priate. However, the deployment of technologies that reduce the emission of greenhouse gases other 
than CO2 is also important. 
Figure 1: Global energy-related emissions 1980–2030 
 
 
Source: International Energy Agency (2008 b). 
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leveraging these private financial flows. It may also fill the financing gap arising from the 
credit crunch during the current financial crisis. Some economic stimulus packages have 
included measures to encourage “clean” investment (Höhne et al. 2009, 5). The Chinese 
and South Korean packages stand out in this respect, with green investments representing 
34 per cent and 78 per cent of the total stimulus, respectively (UNEP 2009, 2). 
However, public financial support alone will not be enough to mobilize the amount of 
private investment needed. International as well as national policies will be needed to set 
appropriate frameworks and create incentives for private investment in clean technologies. 
These frameworks may differ according to the respective conditions, needs and potentials 
of countries. With account taken of best-practice cases and lessons learned from other 
countries or regions, each country must develop its own low-carbon development path. 
This paper seeks to analyse South Africa’s options for a low-carbon development path by 
examining the prospects for renewable energy. It is arranged as follows. Section 2 dis-
cusses the impact of climate change on South Africa and thus its motivation to join in the 
global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Section 3 lays the foundations for the 
analysis by illustrating the structure and sources of South African emissions. Section 4 
focuses on electricity generation as the sector accounting for the largest share of total CO2 
emissions. Section 5 explores and evaluates measures to reduce emissions in the electricity 
sector through the promotion of renewable energy, with particular emphasis on measures 
to promote private investment in renewable energy. A discussion of the need for further 
action and recommended solutions complete the analysis. Section 6 concludes. 
2 South Africa in the face of climate change 
Africa is regarded by the United Nations as one of the continents most vulnerable to the 
impacts of climate change as a consequence of its high dependency on agriculture, the 
water stress from which it already suffers and its weak adaptive capacity (IPCC 2007b, 
435). The likely impacts are numerous (see Figure 2). 
However, the impacts of climate change differ in the various African regions. In South 
Africa, water supply is a particularly vulnerable area with respect to climate change. Even 
without climate change, South Africa might utilise most of its surface water resources 
within a few decades (DEAT 2005). Climate change is likely to intensify water scarcity, 
increase demand for water and lead to a deterioration of water quality. Desertification may 
thus be exacerbated. This is already a widespread problem in the country, much of South 
Africa being arid and subject to droughts and floods (DEAT 2005). Agricultural output, 
which needs to increase to meet the needs of a growing population, can be expected to 
decline unless corrective measures are taken (see Figure 3). 
The above figure depicts the projected percentage change in African yields of 11 major 
crops between present and 2050. Yield losses of up to 20 per cent can be expected in 
South Africa. 
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As a consequence of the expected decrease in river flows, the areas suited for the coun-
try’s fauna and flora may shrink to about half of their current size, resulting in huge losses 
of biodiversity. This may in turn affect tourism, which contributes as much as 10 per cent 
of South African GDP, the potential economic loss thus being considerable (Turpie et al. 
2002, iii). Climate change can further be expected to have an adverse effect on health in 
South Africa. The higher temperatures may cause an increase in the occurrence of skin 
rashes, dehydration and death due to heat strokes. Moreover, temperature rises and 
changes in rainfall patterns will enlarge the breeding grounds for such diseases as malaria 
and bilharzia, leading to a higher proportion of deaths, higher treatment costs and a greater 
loss of earnings (DEAT 2005). 
In addition, the adaptive capacity of large sections of the South African population is low. 
According to the United Nations Development Programme, 43 per cent of the population 
still live on less than USD 2 per day (UNDP 2008, 34). The majority of the poor live in 
rural areas and rely on agricultural incomes (Mbuli 2008, 4), which are sensitive to 
changes in weather patterns likely to occur as a result of global warming. The low saving 
capacity of poor households and the frequent lack of access to financial services mean 
limited financial reserves for use in the event of a bad harvest. If households are forced to 
sell income-earning assets to survive a bad year, they can fall into extreme poverty.  
These households typically cause low per capita greenhouse gas emissions. It is thus 
ironic that the sections of the population most likely to be adversely affected by climate 
change are the ones that contribute least to global warming. 
Figure 2: Climate change impacts in North, East, South, West and Central Africa 
 
 
Source: IPCC (2007b, 451). 
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3 South Africa’s contribution to climate change 
South Africa is already being affected by global climate change, and the impacts will in-
tensify in the coming decades. However, it is also a contributor to global greenhouse gas 
emissions. In 2005, it was responsible for about 1.1 per cent of global emissions and about 
40 per cent of emissions in sub-Saharan Africa (WRI 2009). At an average of 8.8 tonnes 
CO2e per person in 2000, the per capita emission rate was above the global average of 6.7 
tonnes and almost twice as high as the sub-Saharan average of 4.5 tonnes. It almost 
equalled the average per capita emissions of 10.2 tonnes in the European Union. The va-
lidity of average values is, however, limited. As in many developing countries, the distri-
bution of available income and thus household expenditures is highly uneven in South 
Africa (see Figure 4). It is likely that expenditures on energy and thus emissions intensity 
follow a similar distribution pattern. 
 
 
Figure 3: Change in African agricultural yields by 2050 
Percentage change  
 
   
Source: World Bank (2009 b): 145. 
Note: The figure shows a world map detail. Depicted are changes in yields of wheat, rice, maize, millet, 
 field peas, sugar beet, sweet potato, soybeans, groundnuts, sunflower and rapeseed given current 
 agricultural practices and crop varieties. Values are the mean of three emission scenarios across 
 five global climate models, assuming no CO2 fertilization. 
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As incomes rise and the South African government continues its attempts to provide uni-
versal access to electricity, emissions intensity is expected to increase, at least if the cur-
rent carbon intensity of electricity production is maintained. At about 850g CO2/kWh, the 
South African average is nearly twice as high as in the industrialized countries. CO2 con-
sequently accounts for the largest proportion of total greenhouse gas emissions in the 
country (about 80 per cent), and it stems mainly from electricity production (WRI 2009). 
Reasons for this high emissions intensity are discussed in the analysis of the South African 
electricity sector in Section 4. 
South Africa reacted to the emissions intensity by producing two Long-Term Mitigation 
Scenarios (LTMS) in 2007 (DEAT 2007). They show possible emission pathways from 
2003 to 2050, one being a business-as-usual scenario without any constraints on the 
growth of emissions, the other a mitigation scenario. The “growth-without-constraints” 
scenario is dismissed as being neither robust nor plausible (DEAT 2007, 12). The mitiga-
tion scenario aims at reducing South African emissions by 30 to 40 per cent between 2003 
and 2050. For this scenario, four options with different levels of ambition are identified: 
Start Now, Scale Up, Use the Market and Reach for the Goal (see Figure 5).  
The last and most ambitious option, “Reach for the Goal”, depicted as a grey wedge in 
Figure 5, combines the mitigation efforts of the other three options and adds the use of yet 
unknown technologies and behavioural change. Only this scenario achieves the envisaged 
emission reductions of 30 to 40 per cent from the 2003 level. However, as it involves new 
technologies and attempts to steer behaviour, it entails a high level of uncertainty. 
Figure 4: Uneven distribution of household expenditures – Lorenz curve for South Africa,
 1995 and 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bhorat / van der Westhuizen (2008, 13). 
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As the electricity sector is the largest source of emissions in South Africa, all mitigation 
options involve changes in that sector. Fundamental changes require a careful analysis of 
existing conditions. 
4 The electricity sector 
4.1 Structure of the South African electricity sector 
The sector is dominated by Eskom, a state-owned enterprise. Eskom not only produces 
almost all of South African electricity (95 per cent), but also owns and operates the na-
tional transmission system (Bredell 2008, 1). Only about 2 per cent of South African elec-
tricity is produced by private companies (US EIA 2008). 
The primary energy source used in electricity production is coal (86 per cent), followed by 
nuclear energy (5 per cent) and various other sources, including renewable energies such 
as hydro power (see Figure 6). The coal used is easily accessible and of poor quality, re-
sulting in a low input cost. At nearly 50 billion tonnes, South Africa has the world’s sixth 
largest recoverable coal reserves. It will not therefore be due to a lack of coal that an en-
ergy shift takes place (US EIA 2008). 
Eskom is operating at nearly full capacity: peak demand is currently about 36 GW, 
matched by an installed capacity of nearly 40 GW, giving a narrow reserve margin of 
Figure 5: South African mitigation options 2003–2050, Long-Term Mitigation Scenario 
 
 
Source: DEAT (2007, 24). 
Note: CDP depicts the development of emissions under current development plans. 
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about 10 per cent (DME 2008). This tense situation resulted in South Africa experiencing 
serious power shortages in early 2008, their economic impact estimated at between USD 
253 and 282 million USD (US EIA 2008). 
The shortages were caused by rising demand and inadequate investment in additional sup-
ply. Until the mid-1990s, Eskom had excess supply capacity. However, in 1994 only 36 
per cent of South African households had access to electricity (Eskom s.a.). In the course 
of mass electrification programmes, this situation has changed. In 2004, 72 per cent of 
households were electrified, and the government wants to achieve universal access by 
2012 (Eskom s.a.). In addition, stable economic growth and industrialization have led to 
rising electricity consumption. In the future, demand for electricity is expected to increase 
by 4 per cent per year, leading to a doubling of total demand and so an additional require-
ment of 40 GW by 2025. 
To meet this challenge, the Department of Minerals and Energy and Eskom jointly re-
leased a policy document entitled “National response to South Africa's electricity short-
age” in 2008. The plan includes such supply-side interventions as a 2400 MW generation 
capacity expansion programme involving two new coal-fired power stations, the return to 
service of three stations mothballed in the 1990s and the exploration of co-generation and 
renewable energy options (DME 2008, 7). On the demand side, the aim of the “Power 
Conservation Programme” is to reduce demand by means of power quota allocations 
combined with penalties and positive incentives. In the medium to long term, Eskom’s 
aim is to reduce demand by about 3000 MW by 2012 and a further 5000 MW by 2025 by 
encouraging a behavioural change in its customers. The savings are to be achieved inter 
alia through the increased installation of solar water heaters and use of energy-efficient 
light bulbs. These programmes are, however, making slow progress. One reason for this is 
Figure 6: Energy mix in South Africa 
 
 
Source: US EIA (2008). 
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a lack of the skilled personnel needed for the testing and installation of solar water heaters. 
Another reason may lie in the programme’s lack of funding, which is related to the high 
annual losses incurred by Eskom. In 2008 it made a record loss of ZAR 9.7 billion.  
The adjustment of the power tariff regime to reflect the actual cost of electricity provision 
will help to ease Eskom’s tense financial situation. It will also create incentives for en-
ergy-saving. In 2008, Eskom applied for a 60 per cent electricity tariff increase, and the 
National Energy Regulator of South Africa (Nersa) eventually allowed a 27.5 per cent 
rise, approving a further 31.3 per cent rise in 2009. In spite of this increase, the price of 
electricity in South Africa is among the lowest in the world.  
The South African electricity sector therefore faces three problems. The first is electricity 
undersupply, resulting in a narrow reserve margin and power shortages. Given a projected 
doubling in demand within the next 15 years, the pressure to increase electricity supply 
and/or reduce demand is immense. Eskom estimates it will need ZAR 300 billion over the 
next decade for the extension of power infrastructure. At the same time, Eskom is dra-
matically underfunded. The third problematic aspect is the high emission intensity of the 
South African economy, especially the electricity sector, and the resulting environmental 
damage.  
The promotion of renewable energy technologies can provide a solution to the electricity 
supply and emission intensity aspects of the South African energy challenge. However, in 
spite of a high resource potential, there has so far been little progress in the deployment of 
renewables. The obstacles to the large-scale dissemination of renewable energy in South 
Africa are numerous, but not impossible to overcome.  
4.2 Barriers to renewable energy 
While there are some natural barriers, such as the limits to biomass use, and specific tech-
nology needs, such as waterless cooling systems owing to the scarcity of water, the main 
barriers are to be found in the South African energy innovation system and in the econom-
ics of renewable energy technologies.  
The South African innovation system is characterized by a high path dependency. Having 
its roots in the apartheid period, when independence from external energy supplies was a 
political necessity, energy research has centred on fossil fuel technologies. As coal is an 
abundant source of energy in South Africa, both electricity and fuel are produced from 
coal. The two main energy providers, Eskom (electricity) and Sasol (fuel), are responsible 
for the bulk of investment in energy research and development. At the same time, they are 
almost monopsonistic employers of university graduates in the relevant fields. These pat-
terns have led to an extreme bias in innovative capacity towards fossil fuel innovation. 
Renewable energy technologies, on the other hand, lack the capacity basis at all levels of 
education. As monopolistic energy providers, both Eskom and Sasol wield considerable 
power. They use their influence to protect those of the energy market’s features suited to 
their core competencies. Fostering a favourable environment for renewable energy provid-
ers is certainly not part of this strategy. 
Anna Pegels 
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The economic barriers to the deployment of renewable energy in South Africa can be di-
vided into risk and cost factors. Figure 7 depicts the typical risk assessment and lending 
cycle of renewable energy projects. 
Typically, the market for renewable energy technologies is quite young. Its lack of matu-
rity leads to higher volatility and thus to greater risk. If these technologies are politically 
supported by schemes such as a feed-in tariff, as is the case in South Africa, it is uncertain 
whether a change of legislation will alter the economics of a given project. This adds to 
the market risk, as feed-in tariffs are an instrument of market creation. For example, the 
alteration of the Spanish feed-in tariff in 2008 led to a significant fall in solar technology 
market growth rates. As most renewable energy technologies are still in their infancy, they 
entail an additional technology risk. There are only a few concentrated solar power facili-
ties in operation worldwide. The challenges this technology would face under South Afri-
can conditions are still unknown. The enterprise making the first move, only to see its pro-
ject fail, may face not only economic but also reputational risks. The financial institutions 
will factor all these risks into their credit conditions, which will raise the cost of lending. 
In addition, a lack of competition among South African financial institutions may have led 
to reluctance to explore new fields of lending activity in the past. As there is consequently 
a lack of experience with renewable energy projects, it is difficult for project developers to 
obtain funding on the private capital market. 
Figure 7: Renewable energy projects, lending cycle 
 
 
Source: Allianz Group / WWF (2005, 46). 
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In addition to the higher risk they entail, the competitive cost of renewable energy tech-
nologies is a very significant barrier in South Africa. The average price of electricity was 
ZAR 0.198 per kWh in 2007/2008, but since the increases in 2008 and 2009 it has been 
ZAR 0.3314 per kWh (Nersa 2008a, 1). This price is approximately equivalent to EUR 
0.03/kWh, compared to average European prices for households in 2008 being around 
EUR 0.12/kWh (European Commission 2009). The cost of producing electricity from 
wind is about EUR 0.05/kWh, depending on the resource quality of the site (IEA 2008a, 
3). This makes wind energy almost competitive with conventional energy in Europe, 
where conditions are favourable and fossil fuels are comparatively expensive. However, 
this is not the case in South Africa. Here, the consumer price of about EUR 0.03/kWh is 
not sufficient to make wind energy commercially attractive, especially as South Africa 
does not have wind speeds comparable with sites in northern Europe.  
The renewable resource with the greatest potential in South Africa is solar energy. There 
are two main technologies for producing electricity from solar radiation: concentrating 
solar power (CSP), also known as solar thermal energy, and solar photovoltaics (PV). CSP 
technology uses mirrors to concentrate the thermal energy of the sun and heat a transfer 
fluid. The heat energy is then used to produce steam, with which electricity is generated in 
conventional turbines. Photovoltaic panels normally use silicon to convert the solar radia-
tion directly into electricity. Figure 8 shows South Africa’s solar energy potential as the 
annual direct and diffuse solar radiation received on a level surface. 
Figure 8: Annual Solar Radiation South Africa 
 
 
Source: CSIR et al. (s.a.) 
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The total area of high radiation in South Africa amounts to approximately 194,000 km2, 
including the Northern Cape, one of the best solar resource areas in the world (Eskom 
2002). If the electricity production per square kilometre of mirror surface in a solar thermal 
power station is 30.2 MW and only 1 per cent of the area of high radiation is available for 
solar power generation, then generation potential is already about 64 GW (du Marchie van 
Voorthuysen 2006, 6; Eskom 2002). A mere 1.25 per cent of the area of high radiation could 
thus meet projected South African electricity demand in 2025 (80 GW). This would, how-
ever, require large investments in transmission lines from the areas of high radiation to the 
main electricity consumer centres. The South African national energy regulator Nersa can 
direct the utilities to build these transmission lines, but as financial resources are scarce, 
there must be a thorough assessment as to where new lines are necessary and reasonable. 
The current levelized cost of producing electricity from CSP plants is about EUR 
0.13/kWh in desert climates (DLR 2005, 131). This comparatively high cost is due to the 
high initial investments in solar-thermal power stations. Nonetheless, CSP is the cheapest 
option for producing electricity from solar energy. It is suitable for large-scale plants and 
provides base load, as the heat produced can be stored more easily and cheaply than, for 
example, electricity from solar photovoltaic systems. However, CSP technology is still at 
an early stage of commercialization. The cost reduction potential has not yet been fully 
explored: the German Aerospace Centre (Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt) 
estimates a cost reduction down to EUR 0.05/kWh at a global total installed capacity of 40 
GW achieved between 2020 and 2025 (DLR 2005, 10). 
It thus becomes clear why renewable energy has not yet been exploited on a large scale in 
South Africa. None of the technologies can compete with coal-fired power stations gener-
ating electricity at EUR 0.03/kWh.  
Besides the abundant coal reserves, there is a second reason for the low price of electric-
ity. Most South African power stations were built in the 1970s and 1980s, when exchange 
rates were favourable. In the meantime, they have been fully depreciated, and coal input is 
one of the largest cost factors. While this is now an obstacle to renewable energy, it may 
be a supportive factor in the future. Investment in a new utility must not be compared to 
today’s electricity production cost, but to the cost of alternative new investments. As these 
will require new capital input, the price of electricity will rise in the future. Eskom’s ap-
plications for higher tariffs in 2008 and 2009 to finance investment in new power stations 
document this trend. Over the next three years, Nersa projects annual tariff increases of 20 
to 25 per cent (Nersa 2008a, 2). However, the higher prices are already attracting public 
opposition since they are perceived as a threat to the goal of poverty reduction. The politi-
cal success of South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) party is closely linked to 
and dependent on success in reducing poverty. Given the power shortages and the under-
funding of Eskom, it is doubtful that there will be enough funds available or the political 
will to invest public money in comparatively expensive and risky renewable energy tech-
nologies. It is therefore vital to promote private-sector participation. 
5 Promoting private-sector involvement in renewable energy 
While rising electricity prices will improve the competitive position of renewable energy 
technologies in the future, these technologies will still need considerable support if they 
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are to be deployed on a commercial, large-scale basis. This support is needed as soon as 
possible, since investment cycles are comparatively long in the energy sector. Investments 
in fossil-fuel-powered stations undertaken today lock these technologies in for decades to 
come. The South African government has acknowledged this and consequently taken 
measures to support private investment in renewable energy and other clean technologies. 
In some of these measures, it has emulated successful examples in other countries. 
5.1 National measures 
5.1.1 Renewable energy support schemes worldwide: an overview 
By 2009, at least 73 countries had renewable energy policy targets, with no fewer than 64 hav-
ing specific support schemes in place. As Figure 9 shows, the enhanced policy actions and the 
concerns about energy security and climate change issues are reflected in private investments. 
The most common and probably most effective policy instruments used in support of re-
newable energy technologies are feed-in tariffs (Mendonça 2007, 8). First applied success-
fully in Germany, the scheme has spread to more than 40 countries.4 The idea behind a 
feed-in tariff is to guarantee producers fixed tariffs for power from renewable energy 
                                                 
4 Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century REN21 (2009, 26). 
Figure 9: Global investments in renewable energy (2004–2008) 
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sources over a certain period of time, in most schemes 10 to 20 years. This creates a basis 
for long-term investment planning, since revenues are known and guaranteed in advance. 
The tariffs are usually differentiated according to the renewable energy technology sup-
ported. They exceed the normal electricity price paid by consumers and ideally enable the 
investor to cover his costs and earn a reasonable return on his investment. The additional 
costs due to the higher tariffs are passed on to all power consumers in the form of a pre-
mium per kilowatt hour. In some schemes, tariffs are adjusted over time to prevent consum-
ers from paying unnecessarily high prices and to allow for technology learning curves. 
However, these adjustments must be predictable if investment certainty is to be maintained. 
Renewable energy technologies are also supported by quota models in some countries, nota-
bly the UK and Sweden (Mendonça 2007, 9). In the quota model it is not the tariff that is fixed 
but the quantity of power that must be generated from renewable energy sources or the share 
of renewables in total capacity. The market then determines the price. However, quota sys-
tems appear to be less effective than feed-in tariffs. They do not allow for price differentiation 
for different technologies, as there is only one price for power produced from renewable 
sources. This promotes least-cost technologies and project sites and so brings costs down 
quickly, but it also inhibits the development and commercialization of such earlier-stage tech-
nologies as offshore wind and solar thermal energy. Furthermore, as the price is determined by 
the market, there is no certainty for investors about future prices. If there are few actors in the 
market, price fluctuations may be high. This results in additional risk, which is priced at a pre-
mium by the private sector and acts as an unnecessary obstacle to investment. 
Other support schemes include tax incentives or subsidies for particular technologies, such 
as solar photovoltaics. In addition to raising the revenues from renewable energies, the 
cost of competing fossil fuel technologies needs to be increased if renewables are to be-
come more competitive. This can be done through carbon taxes, cap-and-trade systems or 
other ways of internalizing the external costs caused by fossil fuel technologies. Further-
more, the implicit or explicit subsidization of fossil fuels must be reviewed, even if this is 
strongly opposed by both powerful interest groups and the general public. 
5.1.2 The South African status quo 
5.1.2.1 Renewable Energy White Paper 
In 2003 the South African Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) published a White 
Paper on renewable energy. This document supplements the DME White Paper on Energy 
Policy of 1998 and presents the South African government’s vision, policy principles, 
strategic goals and objectives in the promotion and introduction of renewable energy 
(DME 2003, vii). 
In the document the DME sets a target of a 10,000 GWh renewable energy contribution to 
final energy consumption by 2013 (DME 2003, vii). However, this target is cumulative, 
starting in 2003, and so equivalent to an average of 1000 GWh/year (DME RED 2009, 12).  
As the principal energy sources, the White Paper refers to biomass, wind, solar and small-
scale hydro. It focuses on larger and economically viable projects rather than small-scale 
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electrification programmes, even though electrification is seen as an especially pressing 
issue in rural areas. 
To achieve the renewable energy target, the government is committed to strengthening 
competition in the electricity market. It is seeking to create an enabling environment for 
independent power producers that use renewable energy sources. It is also committed to 
developing a Strategy on Renewable Energy which will “translate the goals, objectives 
and deliverables set out herein into a practical implementation plan” (DME 2003, xiii). 
This overarching strategy has yet to be drafted, however. 
The White Paper specifies a policy review process after five years to see whether the tar-
gets, objectives and deliverables are being met. This process started in 2008, but has made 
little progress to date. The revised White Paper on Renewable Energy is expected to be 
published in late March 2010. 
The Long-Term Mitigation Scenario (LTMS) energy model assumes a renewable electric-
ity share of 15 per cent in 2020 and 27 per cent by 2030 (Hughes et al. 2007, 37). How-
ever, it is unclear if and how this share needed for the LTMS will be reached, as South 
Africa has made little progress towards achieving its 10,000 GWh target in the first half of 
the period (DME RED 2009, 12). To date, only about 3 per cent (296 GWh) has been in-
stalled (DME RED 2009, 13). 
Although little has actually been achieved so far and no overarching renewable energy 
strategy has been established, a number of policy actions expected to augment renewable 
energy deployment in the coming years are planned or have already been implemented. 
They are discussed in the following. 
5.1.2.2 Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (REFIT) 
The policy instrument most recently introduced in South Africa in support of renewable 
energy technologies is the Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (REFIT).  
When the scheme first emerged, Nersa planned for rather low tariff rates subject to annual 
degression (Tables 1 and 2). With rates guaranteed for fifteen years, the time span for in-
vestment planning was short compared to the capital life spans of renewable energy in-
Table 1: Tariff schedule 2008–2013 in ZAR c/kWh (EUR c/kWh) 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Wind 
65.48 
(5.59)
63.87 
(5.45)
62.31 
(5.32)
60.78 
(5.18)
59.29 
(5.06) 
57.84 
(4.93)
Hydro 
73.76 
(6.29)
73.34 
(6.26)
72.92 
(6.22)
72.51 
(6.19)
72.10 
(6.15) 
71.69 
(6.12)
Landfill gas 
43.21 
(3.69)
42.71 
(3.64)
42.21 
(3.60)
41.72 
(3.56)
41.23 
(3.52) 
40.75 
(3.48)
Concentrating solar 
60.64 
(5.17)
60.03 
(5.12)
59.43 
(5.07)
58.84 
(5.02)
58.25 
(4.97) 
57.67 
(4.92)
Source: Nersa (2008b, 8). 
Note: Exchange rate used is ZAR 1 = EUR 0.0853 (24 April 2009) 
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vestments of 25 to 30 years assumed in Nersa’s initial calculation (Energy for Sustainable 
Development Ltd., Palmer Development Group 2008, 7–13). 
Nersa then invited and received a number of comments from stakeholders and the public 
in the form of submissions and public hearings. After deliberations in early 2009, the final 
decision on tariffs and contract length was taken in March 2009. 
The initial phase of the adjusted REFIT includes four technologies with the following tariffs. 
The tariffs are guaranteed for 20 years without degression. Six months after the REFIT 
launch Nersa plans to include other renewable energy technologies, such as biomass and 
solar photovoltaics. Each technology will be eligible for a different tariff, since the costs 
differ in each case. The differentiated tariff system is to allow licensees to recover the full 
cost of the licensed activities plus a reasonable return. The REFIT design will be reviewed 
annually for the first five years and every three years thereafter to avoid a lock-in of in-
adequate tariffs. Adjusted tariffs will apply only to new projects. Investors can thus plan 
their investments on a long-term basis.  
The changes to the REFIT design are substantial. While the initial design was greeted with 
scepticism, the new tariff rates were well received by investors and environmental organi-
zations on their introduction. However, the REFIT has one crucial flaw: only the monopo-
listic electricity supplier Eskom is allowed to buy the electricity produced from renewable 
energy sources, although it is not obliged to do so. This makes for considerable uncer-
tainty among renewable energy project developers and so removes reliability of profits as 
the most important incentive of the feed-in tariff scheme. Reliable profits have, however, 
been the basis of the scheme’s success in other countries. The REFIT in its current form is 
therefore unlikely to have the intended positive effect on private investment activity. 
Table 2: Annual REFIT degression 
 Rate Degression (%)
Wind 2.45
Hydro 0.57
Landfill gas 1.16
Concentrating solar 1.00
Source: Nersa (2008b, 8). 
Table 3: Revised REFIT rates 
 ZAR c/kWh (EUR c/kWh)
Wind 125 (10.66)
Hydro    94 (8.02) 
Landfill gas    90 (7.68) 
Concentrating solar 210 (17.91)
Source: Nersa (2009, 28). 
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The effects of feed-in tariffs on the consumer price level of electricity are indirect and diffi-
cult to estimate. They depend on the tariff level, but also on the success it has in promoting 
investment in renewable energies. The higher the amount of “green” electricity fed into the 
grid, the more expensive the tariff system and the stronger the impact on electricity prices 
paid by the consumer. The German renewable energy law is estimated to have caused a price 
increase of about 12 per cent between 2002 and 2006 (BMU 2007, 13). This moderate in-
crease may be due to the already comparatively high price of electricity in Germany. The 
situation may differ in South Africa, depending on the actual success of the REFIT. This may 
be another obstacle to the success of the South African REFIT scheme. Public support may 
wane as consumers start to feel the price increase caused by the support for renewable energy. 
Before the introduction of the REFIT, there were earlier, but basically unsuccessful at-
tempts to stimulate greenhouse gas mitigation projects in South Africa. 
5.1.2.3 Tax exemption for Clean Development Mechanism revenues 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is one of the flexible mechanisms for which 
the Kyoto Protocol provides. It allows developers of low carbon projects in developing 
countries to generate carbon credits and sell them in the carbon market, thus obtaining 
additional financial resources. To promote clean investments, the South African govern-
ment has introduced a tax exemption for CDM revenues. This measure is also aimed at 
improving South Africa’s attractiveness for CDM projects. To date, the majority of CDM 
projects are situated in China and India (see Figure 10). 
Of the 4869 projects in the 2009 CDM pipeline, South Africa has managed to attract only 
29.5 The reasons for this rather poor performance are manifold, and tax exemption is 
unlikely to be the solution. Not only does the private sector lack the capacity to deal with 
                                                 
5 UNEP Risoe Centre CDM/JI Pipeline Analysis and Database, May 1st 2009.  
Figure 10: Geographical distribution of CDM projects 
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the complex CDM regulations, but an extensive national approval procedure also has to be 
completed. For definitive approval by the Designated National Authority (DNA), projects 
must meet various social, economic and environmental requirements from a list of criteria 
for sustainable development. This approval procedure slows the project planning process 
and so increases costs for project developers. Besides the sustainability criteria, an envi-
ronmental impact assessment may be required for various project types. 
However, the potential for CDM projects in South Africa is large. The high emissions 
from the use of coal mean there is potential for major reductions, and the levels of techno-
logical and economic development are comparatively high. Coupled with its abundant 
renewable energy resources, South Africa provides a favourable project development and 
investment climate. In 2006 PricewaterhouseCoopers estimated that at least ZAR 5.8 bil-
lion (about EUR 530 million) could be earned by 2012 from the sale of CDM credits gen-
erated in South Africa (Fakir / Nicol 2008, 25). The DNA is attempting to tackle the ca-
pacity problem by holding a series of CDM promotion and capacity-building workshops. 
5.1.2.4 Carbon Tax vs. Cap and Trade 
While the aim of a feed-in tariff is to encourage investments in renewable energy, a carbon 
tax or cap and trade system seeks to discourage investments in fossil fuel technologies. 
Carbon taxes lead to a direct increase in the cost of producing electricity. If this increase is 
passed on to consumers, the price of electricity to households and to industry is affected. 
As a principal goal of South Africa’s policy has long been universal access to electricity, 
with particular emphasis on the poor and rural areas, a policy trade-off may occur. Any 
suspicion of a conflict with such a high priority policy aim may make it difficult to “sell” a 
carbon tax to voters. This is especially true at times of financial and economic crisis, cli-
mate change being regarded by the public as a problem to be solved by the countries that 
are historically responsible. It may be politically more acceptable to introduce a levy on 
local air pollution, which will have a side-effect on greenhouse gas emissions, but focus 
on the benefits to local health. According to findings of a study by Spalding-Fecher and 
Matibe (2003), however, the external costs caused by air pollution in South Africa are 
considerably lower than those due to greenhouse gas emissions (see Table 4). 
From an economic point of view, it is therefore more important to endogenize the external 
costs of greenhouse gas emissions than the costs of local air pollution. However, it is un-
Table 4: External costs of electricity generation from coal (1999 Rand c/kWh) 
 Per unit of coal-fired power produced 
 Low Central High 
Air pollution and health 0.5 0.7 0.9 
Climate change 1.0 4.3 9.8 
Total 1.5 5.0 10.7 
Source: Spalding-Fecher / Matibe (2003, 727). 
Note: The estimate excludes the benefits of electrification from the avoidance of the indoor use of  
 dangerous fuels. 
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clear whether a carbon tax would have the desired steering effect on emissions in South 
Africa. Eskom’s de facto monopoly would simply allow it to pass the full costs on to the 
consumer, there being no incentive to change fuel use to cleaner energy. The only effect 
on emissions would then come from electricity savings on the demand side due to the 
higher price level. 
For that reason and because a tax directly increases the price of fossil fuel use, South Afri-
can companies and the public oppose a carbon tax. Despite this, Environment Minister van 
Schalkwyk announced a ZAR 0.02/kWh levy on non-renewable electricity in 2008. The 
levy had already been included in the 2008 budget, and its introduction was scheduled for 
September 2008, but was eventually deferred until mid-2009. It was then included in the 
31.3 per cent electricity price increase permitted by Nersa, which left Eskom with an aver-
age net price increase of 24.08 per cent. 
The generation of revenues is one of the advantages of a carbon levy. These revenues may 
be used to cushion the impact of the levy on the poor. This can be done by reducing other 
taxes that affect the poor in particular, such as value-added tax on essential foodstuffs, or 
by subsidizing the electricity tariff for the poor (Winkler 2009, 81). Even though South 
Africa’s environmental tax revenues are not earmarked, the price increase to poor house-
holds was restricted to 15 per cent by Nersa.  
In spite of the opposition to higher electricity prices, the Long-Term Mitigation Scenario 
(LTMS) entails the introduction of fiscal measures to reduce carbon emissions. The miti-
gation option “Use the Market” proposed in the LTMS includes an escalating tax on 
greenhouse gas emissions, rising from ZAR 100 per tonne of CO2eq in 2008 to ZAR 750 
in 2040. This would translate into a tax of ZAR 0.102/kWh in 2008 and ZAR 0.765/kWh 
in 2040, assuming that 1.02 tonnes of CO2 is emitted during the coal-based production of 
1 MWh electricity. This demonstrates the gap between the mitigation scenarios, the most 
optimistic still not reaching the “required-by-science” emission limit, and political reality, 
where the introduction of a ZAR 0.02/kWh carbon levy is already proving to be problem-
atic. 
An alternative approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions is the adoption of a cap-
and-trade system. This system is already established in the European Union and may be 
adapted to the South African context. It is uncertain, however, whether the South African 
financial sector can handle the technicalities of a carbon trading system and, even more 
important, if there will be enough local participants to sustain it. With Eskom, Sasol and a 
few mining companies responsible for the bulk of South African emissions, the number of 
actors may be too small to ensure a functioning market. 
5.2 Further gaps and possible solutions 
The attempts of the South African and other developing countries’ governments to en-
courage private investment in clean technologies already look promising. However, the 
gap between policy statements and actual implementation is wide in most countries. This 
has also been true of South Africa. The introduction of the REFIT and the recent tariff 
rises – induced not by environmental concerns but by pure financial necessity – may indi-
cate a change of trend. However, these actions will not suffice to reduce South Africa’s 
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emissions by 30 to 40 per cent from the 2003 level by 2050 as envisaged by the Long-
Term Mitigation Scenario (LTMS). 
On a strategic level, the LTMS has clearly revealed the gap between the level of mitiga-
tion required by science and the planning capability. The most ambitious scenario based 
on concrete action proposals narrows the mitigation gap by only 76 per cent. One quarter 
of the required effort therefore still needs to be made with technologies that are not yet on 
the market and through behavioural change, a somewhat vague concept. This strategic 
deficiency will have to be addressed. Policy measures other than a CO2 tax, such as stan-
dards or regulations, may be explored in further strategic planning. However, when new 
regulatory or policy measures are introduced, they must be coherent with existing policies. 
Various arms of the government must coordinate their activities to avoid conflicting ap-
proaches, such as a feed-in tariff and a competitive bidding process for electricity provi-
sion. This has not always been the case in the past. 
Further strategic planning is thus undeniably required. However, even the best mitigation 
scenario is futile if it fails to induce actions on the ground. There is a serious need for a step-
by-step implementation plan for the most ambitious of the concrete LTMS mitigation op-
tions. This option, Use the Market, includes subsidies for solar water heaters, a technology 
which is very cost-efficient and should indeed be deployed on a large scale. As part of the 
demand-side management programme, Eskom has attempted to encourage the introduction 
of solar water heaters. However, actual progress towards the achievement of the ambitious 
target (installation of a million solar water heaters within three years) is slow. Testing and 
installation capacity is proving to be one of the major bottlenecks. All solar water heaters 
installed under the Eskom programme have to pass a test conducted by the South African 
Bureau of Standards (SABS). As only one test rig is available, testing is too slow to meet 
demand. Another bottleneck is installation capacity, there being few qualified personnel for 
the professional installation of the heaters. The lack of local capacity is a problem that per-
sists at every educational level of the South African renewable energy sector and has an 
even greater impact on the deployment of such sophisticated technologies as concentrated 
solar power. Any large-scale introduction would require building innovative capacity in 
South Africa to enable the development of country-specific technological solutions, e.g. 
water-saving technologies for concentrated solar power (Edkins et al. 2009, 3). 
Even the REFIT, an established renewable energy support measure, faces difficulties. The 
more renewable capacity is built, the higher the additional costs to consumers. As electric-
ity prices are already rising steeply, any additional burden on consumers may not be ac-
cepted. The REFIT may thus be practicable for only small quantities of electricity gener-
ated; a political reality that may reduce the whole scheme to an absurdity. The lack of de-
mand certainty is a further major obstacle to the scheme’s success. To remove this obsta-
cle, either Eskom must be forced to buy electricity produced from renewable energy 
sources, or other entities must be allowed to act as purchasers. 
The trade-off between the need for a higher electricity price and the government’s com-
mitment to providing cheap electricity access, especially for the poor, certainly poses a 
major challenge. Such obstacles must be addressed carefully and in a comprehensive and 
yet detailed manner. They require significant human and financial resources during the 
planning and the implementation phase. Capacity- and awareness-building at all levels is 
vital to the removal of this obstacle, as is the search for new funding sources. 
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Most of the barriers to renewable energy deployment in South Africa, such as the addi-
tional financial burden on consumers caused by the REFIT, high investment costs for grid 
extension, the need for additional education and research and risk cover for early-stage 
technologies, can be overcome with external funding. One of the aims of the international 
climate change negotiations is to establish mechanisms for the financial and technological 
support of mitigation measures in developing countries. Many valuable schemes already 
exist as options in the negotiation documents, the most promising being discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2.2 below. These mechanisms must be put into effect at the critical negotiations to 
be held in Copenhagen in 2009. 
5.2.1 Creating public awareness and acceptance 
In many developing countries, the public’s general awareness of environmental issues is 
rather low. This is especially true of the poorer sections of the population, where, under-
standably, the issues of daily life are of greater concern than, say, the impacts of climate 
change expected to occur in several decades to come. However, renewable energies may 
also provide solutions to the problems arising in the daily lives of the poor. For example, 
they can be used to supply electricity to remote rural areas. As connecting these areas to 
the national grid can be prohibitively expensive, off-grid renewable energy technologies 
may offer viable solutions. Governments may also point to further positive side-effects of 
renewable energy, such as improved health through reduced air pollution, job creation in 
growing markets and greater energy security. 
Besides running its own awareness campaigns, the state may encourage the involvement 
of civil society organizations in increasing awareness of environmental issues and benefits 
of renewable energy. This may enhance public support for policies aimed at a switch in 
energy sources. 
It is evident, however, that gaining public support for costly renewable energy schemes is 
a challenging task in developing countries. The first policy aim in most of these countries 
is development, and particularly poverty reduction. Any conflicting aim will be rejected 
by the public, and politicians who do not bear this in mind are hardly likely to be re-
elected. One of the main obstacles to greenhouse gas mitigation policies is thus the as-
sumed cost to society. That cost ties up financial resources which cannot then be used to 
alleviate poverty. It would, moreover, be borne at national level, while the benefits would 
accrue globally. This creates a disincentive for national governments to implement mitiga-
tion policies. It is therefore of the utmost importance for environmental goals to be aligned 
with development goals or, where this is not possible, at least to neutralize the negative short 
term effects of environmental policies. This requires careful planning and in many cases 
additional financial resources, which is too much for developing countries on their own. 
5.2.2 Making use of international mechanisms 
It is generally agreed at the United Nations’ climate change negotiations that developed 
countries must bear the incremental cost of mitigation measures taken by developing coun-
tries. To this end, a multitude of international mechanisms and funding instruments have 
emerged in recent years. They are administered both under the auspices of the UN Frame-
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work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and on a bi- or multilateral basis. Some of 
the funding schemes are specifically aimed at supporting clean technology research and de-
ployment. Most of them seek to leverage private investments, either by using the carbon 
market or by providing grants and concessional loans for clean technology projects. 
5.2.2.1 Policy and sectoral Clean Development Mechanism 
The CDM, one of the market-based Kyoto mechanisms, has been heavily criticized for the 
high transaction costs caused by its project-by-project approach. Lengthy approval proce-
dures increase the complexity of the CDM and so reduce its attractiveness. These costs 
and the actual project investment costs occur ex ante, while the revenues from CDM cer-
tificates are generated ex post. The CDM thus exacerbates the initial investment problem 
rather than alleviating it. Other CDM rules have even been criticized in the past for creat-
ing adverse incentives that result in rising total greenhouse gas emissions (see Box 1). 
Given these and other deficiencies, various attempts are being made to reform the CDM. 
The sectoral and policy CDMs are among the most promising approaches to supporting 
the transformation of the energy sector. 
The sectoral CDM suggests that mitigation activities should be scaled up to cover whole 
economic or geographic sectors. One of the cost factors in CDM projects is the definition 
of an emissions baseline. This baseline is a scenario giving a reasonable representation of 
the greenhouse gas emissions that would occur within the project boundary if that project 
was not implemented. This definition has to be made afresh for each new project. To re-
duce these transaction costs, two new concepts for defining a sectoral emissions baseline 
are currently under discussion. One is a multi-project approach involving a standardized 
baseline for similar types of projects in a given sector. Credits would be granted to private 
entities whose emissions fell below that baseline. Once a multi-project baseline had been 
approved, the costs incurred for new projects would be lower since project developers 
would not need to develop their own baselines. One disadvantage of the multi-project ap-
proach is that, as not all entities in the sector would be required to participate, overall 
emissions in the sector concerned could theoretically rise. In addition, free-riding might 
Box 1: Adverse incentives created by CDM rules – the case of HFC-23 
The greenhouse gas HFC-23 is a by-product of the refrigerant HCFC-22, which is used in the 
manufacture of air conditioning equipment. It has an enormous global warming potential: one 
tonne of HFC-23 has the same effect as 14,800 tonnes of CO2 (IPCC 2007a, 212). As the CDM 
grants carbon credits according to global warming potential avoided, projects that reduce hydro-
fluorocarbons generate large numbers of CDM certificates. In addition, the elimination of HFC-
23 is highly cost-efficient. This profitability creates incentives to increase investment in facilities 
producing HCFC-22, even though this greenhouse gas has a global warming potential of 1,810 
CO2e. In addition to a potentially increased total emission of greenhouse gases, HFC-23 projects 
rarely generate sustainable development benefits and do not contribute to the economic trans-
formation of developing countries towards low-carbon growth. Renewable energy projects 
would be more suitable in this respect; however, they reduce CO2 and thus generate fewer carbon 
credits. In addition, they usually require high initial investments. As a consequence, they are 
much less favourable under current CDM rules. By September 2009, HFC projects have received 
56 per cent of CDM credits issued; renewable energy projects only 12 per cent. 
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increase. Project developers would not have to demonstrate the additionality of their pro-
ject, i.e. prove that the investment would not have taken place in the absence of the CDM. 
Doing better than the multi-project benchmark would be sufficient to obtain credits. This 
might lead to windfall gains. However, in any approach it is difficult to exclude free-
riders. As the current additionality criterion raises the complexity of CDM projects in 
practice, this requirement should be relaxed. Conservative baselines may alleviate the 
free-rider problem. 
The second sectoral CDM concept involves the establishment of an emissions baseline 
across an entire national (or even international) sector. The national government – or an 
alternative entity – is granted credits if the performance of the entire sector is better than 
the baseline. The revenues may be passed on as an incentive to enterprises in the sector to 
implement mitigation projects. 
The policy CDM is another reformative approach. Here, the host country’s government 
plays a crucial role. By implementing policies specifically designed to encourage emission 
reduction activities, the government can obtain CDM credits. It does not have to pass 
these credits on, but can decide on its own how to encourage the actors covered by the 
policy. The private sector may be induced to participate by standards, such financial in-
centives as tax concessions and other measures. The emissions baseline is calculated on 
the basis of the status quo.  
This type of CDM may encourage the structural change that is needed for a low-carbon de-
velopment path. It reduces adverse incentives that may impede emission-reducing policies, 
as governments may fear that a new policy will undermine the additionality of future CDM 
projects (Winkler 2004, 118). Instead, a policy CDM supports mitigation measures by giv-
ing credit for what is achieved with them. However, if policies cut across different sectors, it 
may be difficult to quantify the emission reductions actually achieved. Another open ques-
tion concerns the continuity of the policy once the CDM crediting period has expired. 
Furthermore, if the CDM is extended to policy or sectoral schemes, it is important to avoid 
the double-counting of emission reductions. It must be clear which activity is eligible un-
der which policy tool, and a clear line needs to be drawn between existing CDM projects 
and new activities under any of the extended mechanisms. 
A generalized CDM, such as a sectoral or policy scheme, would have a key benefit that 
might help countries like South Africa to attract CDM projects. While the host- country 
governments are hardly involved in the current project-based approach, an extended ver-
sion of the CDM would require much wider participation. As new legislation and regula-
tions would be needed, the general involvement of ministries and the private sector would 
be needed. 
In South Africa, the combination of responsibilities for energy and mineral resources in 
one ministry has not been conducive to a shift to renewable energy. It has in fact strength-
ened the path dependency of South African energy production as mining companies have 
lobbied for cheap electricity supplies. This situation may change after the elections in 
2009, when the ministry is to be split. 
The financial resources generated by a policy CDM may encourage ministries to cooperate 
more closely in support of renewable energy. They can even be used as an argument to fos-
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ter public acceptance of such renewable energy support measures as the REFIT. Negative 
income effects on consumers, especially the poor, can be minimized. With additional fund-
ing to mitigate the effect on consumer prices and a purchase guarantee for the electricity 
generated, the South African REFIT may even contribute to the large-scale deployment of 
renewable energy. However, if the CDM certificates are granted ex post, they will not alle-
viate the urgent problem of underfunding in the South African electricity sector. 
Both policy and sectoral CDMs would ease the administrative requirements which the 
current project-based CDM entails for South African enterprises. These requirements are a 
major obstacle. However, not only does the CDM scheme need to be reformed if South 
Africa is to be able to participate in the market: the stringent project requirements laid 
down by the Designated National Authority and the lengthy approval process also need to 
be adjusted. This problem can be solved only at national level, not by a change to the 
CDM rules. 
5.2.2.2 Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
It has been proposed that, to link the CDM options mentioned above and other measures 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, a registry of nationally appropriate mitigation actions 
(NAMAs) should be established under the UNFCCC. NAMAs are meant to be country-
driven and voluntary. They could be financed by credits for the verifiable reductions aris-
ing from them, though not necessarily restricted to or identical with CDM credits. A re-
newable energy feed-in tariff, an energy efficiency standard and a national carbon tax are 
examples of NAMAs. 
NAMAs may also include the concept of sustainable development policies and measures 
(SD-PAMs). The SD-PAM approach6 (Winkler et al. 2002) recognizes that for many de-
veloping countries economic development has a higher priority than the abatement of 
greenhouse gas emissions. These countries face urgent challenges that outweigh climate 
change mitigation considerations, such as poverty reduction, access to electricity and a 
growing demand for mobility. In South Africa’s case, the government’s electrification 
programme has brought about improvements in electricity access, but also led to rising 
emissions. 
The SD-PAMs seek to resolve this potential conflict between a nation’s development 
goals and the need to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The World Resources Institute 
defines them as “policies and measures taken by a country in pursuit of its domestic policy 
objectives (…) but which are shaped so as to take a lower-emission path to those objec-
tives” (WRI 2005, vii). This means that developing countries themselves would begin by 
identifying long-term development objectives as their core goals. Next, they would iden-
tify policies and measures that make this development path more sustainable. In most 
cases these would include enhanced deployment of renewable energy. Emission reduc-
tions would be reported as co-benefits, but the policy emphasis would remain on devel-
opment. 
                                                 
6 Put forward in the UNFCCC negotiations by the Republic of South Africa in 2006. 
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However, a potential weakness of SD-PAMs is their uncertain environmental outcome. 
Drastic emission reductions are required if the 2°C limit is not to be exceeded, and recent 
scientific results indicate that the joint efforts will have to be much stronger in the years to 
come than they have been to date, with a start made as early as possible. SD-PAMs may 
therefore be a reasonable part of an international agreement, but without a clear emission 
reduction or limitation target they will be insufficient.  
The total investment required for the change of entire development paths towards low-
carbon growth is substantial. It is therefore vital that mitigation policies aim at mobilizing 
domestic and international private financial resources. Public funding could be used as 
leverage and cover the additional costs imposed on societies compared to business-as-
usual policies.  
5.2.2.3 International public funding 
The discussions in the climate change negotiation process have revolved around different 
approaches to raising public funds in the coming commitment period. Mexico and the 
Group of 77 and China have proposed defined contributions from national budgets to 
cover the expense of climate change mitigation.7 The contribution proposed by the latter is 
0.5 to 1.0 per cent of developed countries’ GNP, which would total around USD 200-400 
billion annually. This amount would be additional to existing commitments of official 
development assistance (ODA). However, developed countries are already struggling to 
achieve their promised goal of 0.7 per cent of GNP as ODA. It is doubtful that an addi-
tional commitment based on an annual percentage of GNP would in practice yield addi-
tional financial resources on the scale required. This is especially true in the light of the 
current financial crisis, which is already placing a heavy burden on developed countries’ 
national budgets. The opportunity to foster green investments as part of the economic re-
covery programmes has largely been ignored by developed countries. Of the USD 1100 
billion made available by the European Union, Germany, France, Italy, the UK and the 
US, only USD 73 billion has been invested in climate-friendly measures (Höhne et al. 
2009). Investments by South Korea and China, on the other hand, stand out as being par-
ticularly environment-friendly. 
International funding sources and the use of market mechanisms may yield better results 
than national budgetary contributions from industrialized countries. The German Advisory 
Council on Global Change (WBGU) recently proposed a budgetary approach, in which the 
first step would be to calculate a global amount of CO2 that might be emitted between now 
and 2050 (WBGU 2009). This global budget would then be divided equally among coun-
tries on a per capita basis, with account taken of the historical responsibility of the indus-
trialized countries. To avoid CO2 mismanagement, each country would develop a decar-
bonisation road map with interim targets. The balance between actual emissions paths and 
CO2 budgets would be achieved by emissions trading and other flexible mechanisms. In 
order to soften the steep reduction paths required of industrialized countries, they would 
have to buy large numbers of carbon credits from developing countries, which would give 
                                                 
7 The Group of 77 (G77) was established in 1964 by 77 developing countries. It is the largest intergov-
ernmental organization of developing states in the United Nations and pursues the aim of enhancing 
their joint negotiating capacity. Today, 130 countries are member of the G77. 
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rise to substantial flows of funds. However, these flows could be achieved only if the cli-
mate change negotiations led to strict emission caps in the coming commitment period. A 
further uncertainty of the carbon market as a source of financing is its potential volatility 
due to market dynamics. Any scheme that raises the supply of carbon credits will lower 
their price, provided that the demand for credits remains constant. Financial flows thus 
may be less predictable. 
Other financing proposals in the climate change negotiation process include capping and 
trading international emissions from air travel and shipping and a global carbon tax.  
The mitigation funding currently available is mainly located outside the UNFCCC. In re-
cent years there has been a proliferation of bi- and multilateral initiatives for climate 
change issues. The World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds and Japan’s Cool Earth Part-
nership are among the most prominent. A total of USD 6.4 billion has been pledged to the 
Climate Investment Funds, comprising the Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Cli-
mate Fund.8 The aim of the Clean Technology Fund is to support clean technologies in the 
power and transport sectors, as well as energy efficiency. The USA, Japan and Germany 
are among the main donors. The Bush Administration originally pledged USD 2 billion to 
the Clean Technology Fund. The Obama Administration has indicated that it wants to 
meet this commitment, but has framed it as a commitment to both the Clean Technology 
and the Strategic Climate Fund. However, the contributions still have to be authorized by 
the Senate and the House of Representatives.  
Within the Cool Earth Partnership, Japan has committed USD 10 billion over five years. 
USD 8 billion is earmarked for the promotion of clean energy. Other bilateral funding 
schemes, such as Germany’s International Climate Initiative and the international window 
of the Environmental Transformation Fund initiated by the UK provide smaller amounts 
of funding. 
Clearly, climate funding cannot rely on only one of the sources discussed above. All 
sources will have to be tapped, and public resources will have to be supplemented by pri-
vate money whenever possible. South Africa has a professionally run and well developed 
capital market. However, climate change issues are not yet covered by the financial insti-
tutions’ project risk assessment procedures. Clean energy projects are perceived as more 
risky than other projects and are granted less favourable credit conditions. The potential of 
the South African private financing sector has yet to be tapped for contributions to the 
transformation of the energy and other high-emission sectors. South African banks might 
follow the example of European and American financial institutions that have successfully 
entered the field of renewable energy project financing. Where due diligence requires spe-
cial expertise or when additional technology or market risks have to be covered, the multi-
lateral development banks might provide assistance. With their long experience of invest-
ing in developing countries, they could contribute to a transformation of the energy market 
by providing support and, moreover, by taking a close look at the climate-friendliness of 
their own investment portfolios. 
                                                 
8 As of April 2009. 
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6 Conclusions 
The challenge of decarbonising entire economies is enormous, especially if a country is as 
fossil-fuel-based and emission-intensive as South Africa. Many of the problems that have 
to be tackled are interconnected and related to underlying issues. For example, to achieve 
a behavioural change from private to public transport, the issue of security in public trans-
port would have to be addressed and solved. This issue again has its roots in social dispari-
ties and poverty. These major social challenges must not be exacerbated by such green-
house gas mitigation measures as a carbon tax, which may adversely affect the incomes of 
poor households. Any mitigation strategy thus has to be carefully designed. 
However, as it already faces climate change impacts in an increasingly carbon-constrained 
world, South Africa must drastically reduce its greenhouse gas emissions intensity soon. 
The energy sector is a vital part of the economy and at the same time contributes most to 
South Africa’s emissions. Transforming this sector is therefore urgently needed, but will 
be difficult. The first steps have been taken to improve energy efficiency and promote 
renewable energy. Although the South African renewable energy market still has a long 
way to go, it may gradually pick up speed, given such support measures as the feed-in 
tariff. More and more projects may become commercially viable, a prerequisite for pri-
vate-sector participation. However, stakeholder and public discussions in the first phase of 
the REFIT have shown that the population’s support for mitigation measures cannot be 
taken for granted. Conflicts with aims having a higher priority, such as poverty reduction, 
must be avoided. In addition, suitable policies must be pursued to ensure feasibility and 
profitability throughout the investment cycle of renewable energy projects. Not only must 
the supplier price of renewable energy be guaranteed in the form of a reliable tariff: de-
mand must also be ensured. If Eskom is to be the only buyer of renewable energy and it 
alone is to decide whether to buy electricity or not, there will be no investment certainty 
for renewable energy project developers. 
The policy measures currently being implemented may lead to the introduction of renew-
able energy technologies at best on a small to medium scale, but they will not suffice for 
the thorough transformation of the South African energy market. This will require the 
creation of a completely new sector, including a considerable scale-up of institutional ac-
tivity, such as education and research, and the creation of a renewable energy market. To 
enable this development, the international community will have to provide generous fund-
ing, technological contributions and capacity building. However, these resources must be 
used within a sound domestic policy framework, which must foster the supply of and de-
mand for renewable energy technologies. On the supply side, extensive capacity-building 
is needed. Research and development funding, which currently goes into fossil fuel re-
search, will have to be diverted. The education system will also have to be adjusted to 
meet the need for capacity at all levels of renewable energy supply. It is the task of na-
tional policy-makers to change the incentives accordingly, difficult though it may be to 
overcome the opposition of existing lobbies and power structures. However, as the energy 
innovation system entails high path-dependency, an external kick-start may be needed. 
International financial and technological assistance will have to play a major role, in the 
form of joint research and development, educational programmes and research networks, 
for example. Second, there must be investment certainty for renewable energy producers, 
which means ensuring reliable demand at reliable prices.  
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For a limited period, demand can be created artificially by such schemes as the REFIT in 
combination with a purchase guarantee. Eventually, renewable energies must be competitive 
on their own, either in terms of actual cost or because customers – or third parties, as the 
international community – are willing to pay a premium for “green” electricity. As most 
renewable energy technologies are still in their infancy, they have a high cost-reduction po-
tential that will be realised with larger amounts of installed capacity. However, the narrow 
window of opportunity for climate change mitigation leaves no room for delay. Public fund-
ing will have to push deployment and thus the learning effects of renewables. Public accep-
tance and thus willingness to pay for renewable energy may be raised by pointing to positive 
side-effects. South Africa is well endowed with renewable energy resources, especially solar 
energy. Tapping into this resource would help to meet both the emissions and the energy 
supply challenge. In addition, the deployment of renewable energy will reduce air pollution 
and so contribute to health improvements. Renewable energy technologies may also in-
crease electricity access in remote areas since they are suitable for small-scale, off-grid solu-
tions. By facilitating income generation and health care, they may help to tackle such social 
issues as rural poverty and the HIV/Aids epidemic. 
To reduce the cost to society and to leverage its national potential, South Africa must 
make wise use of the possibilities emerging within the framework of the international cli-
mate change negotiations. While these negotiations have tended to be slow and cumber-
some, they may be picking up speed in view of the rapidly approaching conference in Co-
penhagen. It is to be hoped that South Africa’s new government will continue to play a 
positive role in the international process, introducing innovative ideas and demonstrating a 
level of commitment that is at present hardly matched by corresponding effort and dedica-
tion on the part of the industrialized countries.  
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